"We'll Get Our Own": Canada and the Oil Shipping Crisis of 1942

© Robert C. Fisher 1993

Tankers were the prime target of the German U-boat offensive into North American waters and the Caribbean Sea in early 1942.(1) Canada was dependent upon the oil brought from southern waters by these ships, but the United States Navy (USN), consumed by the crisis in the Pacific, refused to defend merchant shipping in the western Atlantic. Within weeks, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) responded by unilaterally establishing its own tanker convoys between the West Indies and Halifax. In this dispute between Allies, Canada acted decisively and with immediate effect. Suddenly, the relationship between Canadian naval strength and the protection of the Canadian economy -- hazy in the past because of Canada's junior position in the maritime alliance -- had become vividly apparent.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of foreign oil to the Canadian economy. During 1940 domestic oil fields produced only 8.4 million barrels of the 51 million barrels of crude oil refined in Canada. In addition to imports of 42.6 million barrels of crude, Canada also brought in 5.4 million barrels of blending stocks and processed fuels, for a grand total of 48 million barrels from external sources.(2) Almost fifty per cent of this was shipped by ocean tanker from ports in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. Pipelines and Great Lakes and Pacific ports handled most of the remaining imports.(3)

The geography of the Canadian market required that petroleum be drawn from a variety of sources. Supplies for British Columbia came by ocean tanker from California and Peru. The Prairie provinces relied on oil produced at fields in Alberta and Montana. The Ontario refineries, located in Sarnia and Toronto, were supplied by pipeline and lake tanker from the American mid-west.(4) None of these sources was threatened.

It was Quebec and the Maritimes that bore the brunt of the oil shipping crisis. The five principal refineries that served these provinces (located at Montreal and Dartmouth, Nova Scotia) depended upon crude oil from Colombia, Texas, and Venezuela, carried by the ocean tankers that were the favourite prey of the U-boats. As well, the coastal tankers that distributed the petroleum refined at Dartmouth to ports in the Maritimes and Newfoundland were at risk. Atlantic Canada, moreover, bore the added strain of having to provide fuel for Allied warships operating out of Halifax and St.John's. The Imperial Oil refinery at Dartmouth supplied these bases and the Canadian Oil Controller was responsible for ensuring that supplies were adequate.(5)

Canada suffered from an acute shortage of oil tankers. At the outbreak of the war Canada had only nine ocean-going tankers of over 3,000 gross tons. The Imperial Oil Company owned and operated all of these ships. One of them, SS Canadolite, was captured by the Germans in March 1941.(6) The other oil companies that served eastern Canada -- Shell, McColl-Frontenac, and British American -- chartered British and Norwegian-flag tankers to supply their Montreal refineries. During 1940 and 1941 the requisition of several of these vessels by Great Britain reduced the tonnage available to Canada. Shell lost all of its ships and was forced to change the source for its Montreal refinery from Texas to Illinois oil fields.(7) By June 1941 the Canadian-controlled fleet could only carry seventy-five per cent of domestic oil requirements. McColl-Frontenac and British American still had eight Norwegian tankers under charter but by the end of the year three of these would be requisitioned by the United Kingdom.(8) To ease the strain, a pipeline was built between Montreal and Portland, Maine, during the summer and autumn of 1941. The Portland pipeline shortened the ocean voyage from the Caribbean by 2,000 miles.(9)

Since June 1940, the Department of Munitions and Supply had regulated oil supplies. C.D. Howe, the Minister, had at that time appointed George R. Cottrelle as Oil Controller. Cottrelle had little experience in this field but was a specialist in industrial reorganization.(10) He recognized that an oil shipping expert was required to handle the emerging tanker crisis, and in July 1941 appointed George H.G. Caulton to his staff. The situation deteriorated later in the year with the entry of the United States and Japan into the war. Caulton had to shift one large tanker to the Pacific coast, deepening the Atlantic shortage.(11) Canada's ocean-going tanker fleet had been reduced to six Canadian and five Norwegian-flag vessels on the east coast, and two Canadian-flag vessels on the west coast. The Allied Tanker Control Board estimated Canada's deficiency at 6.6 units.(12) Worse still, German U-boats were now free to raid the previously safe waters of the western hemisphere.

The first blow of the German U-boat offensive -- Operation Drumbeat -- fell on 12 January 1942, when U-123 torpedoed the freighter Cyclops south of Nova Scotia. Over the next nine days, U-123 and her consorts destroyed twenty-six ships. By mid-February, they had sunk sixty-three ships off the coast of Canada and the United States.(13) The U-boats pushed into the Caribbean Sea in mid-February and tanker losses mounted. U-156 shelled the oil refinery at Aruba and torpedoed three tankers in San Nicolas harbour on 16 February. Over the next twelve days, enemy submarines destroyed twenty-six merchant ships and twenty-three tankers in the Atlantic. The slaughter continued in March when submarines sank thirty tankers and fifty-five merchant ships, most of them in the western Atlantic.(14)

Canadian tankers did not escape the carnage off the American coast. On 4 February, U-109 torpedoed and sank SS Montrolite, an Imperial Oil tanker en route from Venezuela to Halifax. Seven days later, northwest of Bermuda, U-564 destroyed SS Victolite, bound for Venezuela. None of Victolite's crew survived and only twenty of Montrolite's crew of forty-eight were rescued. At over 11,000 gross tons, they were two of the largest Canadian-flag tankers. On 5 May, SS Calgarolite, sailing for Cartagena, was torpedoed by U-125 south of Cuba. There were no casualties but three of Canada's four largest tankers had been destroyed within the space of a few months.(15) Only eight were left under charter to the Oil Controller on the Atlantic coast: three Canadian and five Norwegian.(16) These losses had an immediate impact on oil reserves and by late March stocks of naval fuel at St.John's had fallen to under 3,000 tons, only three days supply.(17)

Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, expressed his concern to American authorities about "the immense sinkings of tankers" in the western hemisphere as early as March 1942. Churchill urged the US Navy to "organise immediate convoys in the West Indies-Bermuda area".(18) The Americans lost seventy-three tankers in the first six months of 1942, most of them off their own coast or in the Caribbean. But the British also suffered severely, losing sixty-eight tankers during the same period. In total, the United Nations lost 222 tankers of 2.7 million deadweight tons in the Atlantic to Axis submarines during 1942 and Allied ship yards failed to make good these losses. In addition, the United States and Britain were forced to transfer eighty-nine tankers to the Pacific and Indian Oceans in early 1942.(19)

By April the situation was desperate. The British had lost twenty-one tankers in March, mostly along the US coast. The British cabinet considered suspending tanker sailings in American waters, but instead British shipping from Caribbean ports was re-routed due east to Freetown, Africa to avoid the perilous eastern seaboard.(20) The slaughter continued: thirty-two merchant ships, including sixteen oil tankers, were torpedoed along the American coast in the first two weeks of April.(21) Dönitz boasted, "Our submarines are operating close inshore along the coast...so that bathers and sometimes entire coastal cities are witnesses to that drama of war, whose visual climaxes are constituted by the red glorioles of blazing tankers."(22) Shell Oil Company requested permission to install aircraft on their ships for protection. When the USN refused, Shell offered to operate shore-based aircraft along their tanker routes, also to no avail.(23)

The United States Navy stubbornly refused to introduce convoy to the eastern seaboard, maintaining that sufficient escorts were not available. In contrast, after Drumbeat began the RCN had "decided that coastal convoys were needed in Canadian waters" and scraped the bottom of the barrel to find escorts.(24) However modest many of these craft were, the coastal tankers usually sailed with some protection. The results of the efforts to run a comprehensive coastal convoy system were dramatic. Shipping losses in Canadian waters dwindled from thirty-seven in January and February to eleven in March and April.(25) The RCN Trade Division observed smugly that the US "coast proved the most satisfactory hunting ground throughout March and April while the Canadian coast enjoyed comparative peace".(26)

The losses in April alarmed even American authorities. Vice-Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, petitioned Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet, for destroyers, arguing "that the sinkings of ships, tankers especially, on this coast is a serious matter resulting...in dire consequences to our war effort". If escorts could not be provided, Andrews recommended "the stoppage of tanker sailings until adequate escort vessels are made available".(27) For once Admiral King listened. On 16 April he ordered that "commercial oil tankers for Gulf and Caribbean and U.S. Atlantic ports shall be held in port pending further orders".(28)

The Canadian Oil Controller felt "obliged to follow suit" and prohibited his tankers from sailing.(29) Five Canadian tankers scurried to safety in ports from New York to Key West. This self-imposed blockade forced eastern Canada and the United States to subsist on oil reserves but spared enormous losses. Submarine strength in American waters peaked in the final weeks of April with sixteen to eighteen boats operating between Cape Sable and Key West. Dönitz ruefully observed that "at the end of April the heavy sinkings off the east coast of America suddenly ceased".(30) British oilers resumed sailing on April 23 but were still routed due east to Freetown, Africa.(31) Canadian and American tankers, however, remained in port.

Despite the introduction of gasoline rationing in Canada on 1 April, closure of the coastal routes created an "extremely serious oil situation" at ports in Atlantic Canada.(32) Stocks of fuel at Halifax and St.John's had dwindled to a meagre 45,000 tons by the end of April -- only fifteen days supply. The shortage threatened naval operations, including transatlantic convoys.(33) Vice-Admiral Percy Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff of the RCN, took unilateral action to stave off impending disaster. Although American authorities had prohibited tanker sailings, Nelles, as one of his staff officers later recalled, said "to hell with that, we'll get our own" oil. On 28 April he ordered two destroyers to proceed immediately to American and Caribbean ports to escort Canadian and Norwegian-flag tankers to Halifax. American inability or unwillingness to defend their coastal waters compelled Nelles to establish Canadian oil convoys to the West Indies.(34)

Despite the lifting of the ban on tanker sailings by American authorities on 29 April, Canadian shortages remained acute. The Chiefs of Staff Committee warned the defence ministers that the naval fuel situation was critical.(35) On 1 May, Cottrelle "refused to allow the few remaining tankers under charter to him to move without naval escort" because of the heavy losses and lack of escort in the Caribbean Sea.(36) Ultimate authority for Canadian tankers rested, not with Naval Service Headquarters, but with the Oil Controller. The initial stimulus for the convoys had arisen from the fuel oil requirements of Allied warships at St.John's and Halifax, but the impetus behind Cottrelle's edict was declining reserves at the refineries in Montreal and Dartmouth. Thus, both domestic demand and naval requirements ensured the continuation of the oil convoys.

The initial convoys had been established on an informal basis, but the Oil Controller's ultimatum compelled the RCN to provide escorts for a regular schedule. Naval Service Headquarters decided to transfer four corvettes from the mid-ocean groups to the Halifax force to "continue escorting tankers from Halifax to Trinidad and other ports in Venezuela."(37) Captain Eric Brand, Director of the RCN Trade Division, explained to the Naval Attaché in Washington that Cottrelle's decision forced the RCN "to make serious inroads into our escort forces".(38) The British and Americans did not block this move but the Admiralty was surprised by Canada's independent action, and hoped to include some of its oilers in the new convoys.(39)

Canadian actions should not have been too surprising to the British, who shared the concern about the lack of convoy in the Caribbean. In fact, the Admiralty had attempted to start convoys there in late April. The First Sea Lord suggested this to American officials during his visit to Washington on 26 April, but Admiral King refused to provide escorts. King did, however, agree, on 5 May, to reduce the number of mid-ocean groups from twelve to eleven to free one British group to run a "tanker shuttle" between Trinidad and Aruba under British control.(40) The refineries of Aruba-Curaçao and Trinidad handled most of the oil produced at fields in Colombia and Venezuela. Thus, these islands were the natural ports for any British tanker convoy.(41) British oilers would still sail unescorted between Trinidad and Freetown.

Details of the regular Canadian oil convoys were ironed out in May. The convoy route would pass close to Bermuda to provide some air cover. The northern terminus would be Halifax with local escort provided to the Portland pipeline. There was a fundamental problem, however, because the refineries at Montreal and Dartmouth relied on crude oil from Colombia, Texas, and Venezuela, three widely separated sources. Commander P.B. German, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, advised Caulton that "loading ports may have to be altered" because the shortage of escorts limited the RCN to only one convoy route.(42) German and Caulton settled on Trinidad - close to Venezuela - as the southern convoy terminus.

Canada thus lost access to oil supplies from Texas and Colombia. Caulton had considered Colombian crude "absolutely essential" because Cartagena produced vital supplies of lubricating oil and aviation base crude.(43) The latter was urgently required by the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Instead, he arranged to have the Montreal refineries supplied with aviation crude from Puerto la Cruz, Venezuela. However, Canadian refineries had to do without low cold test lubricating oil which was not available in Venezuela.(44) As a result of the tanker convoys, supplies of crude oil from Colombia to Canada fell from 12.6 million barrels in 1941 to 1.5 million in 1942. Oil imports from Venezuela tripled from 3.2 million barrels in 1940 to 9.4 million barrels in 1942.(45)

Because of the disappearance of shipping off the east coast with the closure of the US ports in mid-April, Dönitz had shifted the main thrust of the U-boat attack into the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.(46) Three-quarters of the oil tankers leaving Texas and Louisiana ports over a two week period were sunk, and Gulf ports were closed to Allied shipping from 6-12 May.(47) Nevertheless, forty-one ships were destroyed in the Gulf during May. Even Admiral King expressed alarm "that the vital Gulf of Mexico link in our common oil chain is now under serious threat and there are no escorts for this route". Enemy U-boats also destroyed thirty-eight merchant vessels in the Caribbean and fifteen ships in the Bermuda area.(48)

The oil shortage in Atlantic Canada was critical pending the arrival of the first convoy from the Caribbean. The fifteen days' oil supply at the end of April had dwindled to dangerously low levels by mid-May.(49) Only one tanker, SS Scottish Heather, had reached St.John's since the end of April; she arrived on 14 May carrying 9,445 tons of naval fuel. The coastal tankers were held in port while SS Teakwood, which normally served as an oil storage tank at St.John's, sailed to Halifax for fuel.(50) Meanwhile, six U-boats lurked in the waters between Bermuda and Nova Scotia but the first oil convoy, consisting of two tankers and a destroyer, arrived safely at Halifax on 17 May. The second convoy, including three tankers and a destroyer, escaped attack and arrived eleven days later.(51)

In May the United States took steps to ease the tanker crisis faced by her allies. The War Shipping Administration transferred twelve American and Panamanian-flag tankers of 170,000 deadweight tons to Canada.(52) This increased the number of ocean tankers under charter to the Oil Controller to twenty. On May 25, however, U-593 torpedoed and sunk SS Persephone off New Jersey, before she could enter Canadian service.(53) The War Shipping Administration also assigned forty-five tankers of 684,000 deadweight tons to the United Kingdom; a transfer that was possible because of a dramatic increase in oil shipments by railway and pipeline within the United States during 1942.(54) Despite these adjustments, the Allied tanker shortage remained acute.

The Canadian oil convoys continued through the summer of 1942 until the USN finally established a comprehensive coastal convoy system in August. Four, and later six, RCN corvettes provided escort for the Canadian oil convoys. In July the terminus was switched from Trinidad to Aruba to allow British oilers to make better use of this route. The sinking of U-94 by HMCS Oakville on 27 August marked the climax of the Caribbean campaign for the Canadian Navy. As U-boat losses climbed in the Caribbean, Dönitz shifted the battle back to the North Atlantic and the threat to Canada's oil supplies subsided.(55)

By any measure the Canadian oil convoys enjoyed great success. Some 2.5 million barrels of petroleum were shipped to the refineries of Dartmouth and Montreal for domestic consumption. Another 1.5 million barrels arrived in Canada for trans-shipment to Britain. The RCN escorted fourteen convoys, including seventy-six tankers, between Halifax and the West Indies without the loss of a single vessel, despite the heavy concentration of U-boats in these waters. During the months from May to August 1942, when U-boats ravaged the waters of the western Atlantic mercilessly, the Canadian oil convoys escaped attack. Given the high number of independent ships sunk in these waters, it is clear that without these convoys several Canadian tankers would have been lost.

Although an economic historian has noted that "during the U-boat attacks of 1942" oil shipments to the United States "from the Caribbean had dropped away almost to nothing", the RCN's effective action ensured that crude oil continued to reach the parched refineries of eastern Canada.(56) The oil convoys, together with the swift organization of coastal convoys in Canadian home waters, were substantial achievements for the RCN in a year that otherwise saw almost continuous crises for the overcommitted Canadian escort forces.




Notes

1. Befehlshaber der U-boote (BdU) War Diary, 15 April 1942, National Defence Headquarters, Directorate of History (DHist), 79/446, Vol.5.

2. John de N. Kennedy, A History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, (Ottawa 1950), 155-7.

3. Memorandum to G.R. Cottrelle, "Re: Price Increases", 31 October 1941, National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 20, Vol.409, C-12. Gulf and Caribbean ports shipped 20 million barrels of crude oil in 1941. Great Lakes ports shipped 12 million barrels, pipeline carried 9 million barrels, and Pacific ports shipped 5 million barrels.

4. Report of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Petroleum, 9 February 1942, DHist, 193.009 (D4); and J.N. Kennedy, A History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, 161.

5. G.N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, (Ottawa 1952), 137, 527; and the Report of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Petroleum, 9 February 1942, DHist, 193.009 (D4).

6. G.N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, 361, 542; and Margaret Hogan, Esso Mariners: A History of Imperial Oil's Fleet Operations, (Toronto 1980), appendix.

7. Memorandum to G.R. Cottrelle, "Re: Price Increases", 31 October 1941, 6-9, NAC, RG 20, Vol.409, C-12. Shell acquired two lake tankers to supply its Montreal refinery.

8. G.M. Cottrelle to L.D. Wilgress, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, 6 June 1941, NAC, RG 20, Vol.252, file 32821; and D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study of Wartime Policy and Administration, (London 1971), 201-210.

9. J.N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, 161-2.

10. Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography, (Toronto 1979), 135.

11. G.M. Cottrelle to L.D. Wilgress, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, 6 June 1941; and G.H.G. Caulton to F.W. Bergen, Executive Secretary of the Tanker Control Board, 19 December 1941, NAC, RG 20, Vol.252, file 32821.

12. J.N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, 161-2.

13. Michael Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, (Kingston 1985), 57-61, 73.

14. BdU War Diary, 16-19 February 1942, DHist, 79/446, Vol.4; and Jurgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, 1939-1945, (Annapolis 1983), 75-88.

15. Jurgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, 77-8, 94; and Margaret Hogan, Esso Mariners, 42-4.

16. J.N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, 162.

17. Flag Officer Newfoundland, Report of Proceedings, March 1942, DHist, NSS 1000-5-20.

18. Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins, 12 March 1942, PRO, ADM 205/13.

19. D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 283-4; and Memorandum, "Oil Flow to East Coast Tightening", 16 January 1942, NAC, RG 20, Vol.409, C10. Allied ship yards produced 1.3 million deadweight tons of tankers during 1942.

20. D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 286; and "Control of Shipping in West Atlantic During U-boat Campaign, January to June 1942", PRO, ADM 205/21, 4.

21. Jurgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, 88-90.

22. Samuel Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939 to May 1943, (Boston 1947), 157.

23. Eastern Sea Frontier, War Diary, April 1942, Chapter VII, "Merchantmen and Tankers", 349, DHist, 85/588.

24. Captain E.S. Brand papers, Annual Report of the Director of the Trade Division, 1942, DHist, 81/145, Vol.1, 7.

25. Michael Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, 80.

26. Captain E.S. Brand papers, Annual Report of the Director of the Trade Division, 1942, DHist, 81/145, Vol.1, 6.

27. CESF to Secretary of the Navy, 10 April 1942, "Subject: Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast", DHist, 85/588, Eastern Sea Frontier, War Diary, April 1942, 356.

28. Eastern Sea Frontier, War Diary, April 1942, Chapter VII, "Merchantmen and Tankers", 349, DHist, 85/588.

29. J.N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, 162.

30. Karl Dönitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, (London 1959), 219-20.

31. "Control of Shipping in West Atlantic During U-boat Campaign, January to June, 1942", PRO, ADM 205/21, 5-9.

32. NSHQ to FONF, 1909Z/28 April 1942, NAC, RG 24 D13 Vol.11969, NW223.

33. Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Ministers, 30 April 1942, DHist, 193.009 (D6). Halifax and St.John's consumed 3,000 tons of naval fuel per day.

34. NSHQ to Admiralty and CinCAWI, 1908Z/28 April 1942; NSHQ to FONF, 1909Z/28 April 1942, both signals in NAC, RG 24 D13, Vol.11969, NW223; and Interview with Vice-Admiral H.G. DeWolf, RCN, 10 December 1987, 27-8, DHist, BIOG D. Nelles quoted by DeWolf.

35. Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Ministers, 30 April 1942, DHist, 193.009 (D6).

36. NSHQ to Admiralty and Cominch, 1658Z/1 May 1942, PRO, MT 59/1998.

37. NSHQ to Admiralty and Cominch, 1658/1 May 1942, PRO, MT 59/1998.

38. Captain E.S. Brand to Commodore V.G. Brodeur, 8 May 1942, NAC, RG 24 D13, Vol.11969, NW223.

39. Memorandum from Director General to W. Humphreys, 6 May 1942, PRO, MT 59/1998.

40. "Control of Shipping in the West Atlantic During U-boat Campaign, January to June 1942", PRO, ADM 205/21, 5-6.

41. D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 258.

42. P.B. German to George Caulton, 19 May 1942, NAC, RG 24, Vol.6789, NSS 8280-800/9.

43. George Caulton to Commander P.B. German, 23 May 1942, NAC, RG 24 Vol. 6789, NSS 8280-800/9.

44. George Caulton to Commander P.B. German, 19 May 1942, NAC, RG 24 D10, Vol.11014, COAC 5-2-2A vol.1.

45. George Caulton to P.B. German, 28 May 1942, NAC, RG 24, Vol.6789, NSS 8280-800/9; and J.N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, II, 156, 162-4.

46. Karl Dönitz, Memoirs, 220-21.

47. Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, Oil and War, (New York 1987), 112; OPNAV to CinCAWI, 6 May 1942, PRO, MT 59/1998; Admiralty to CinCAWI and NSHQ, 1811B/12 May 1942, and Admiralty to BAD, 1328/15 May 1942, PRO, ADM 199/2083.

48. Cominch to First Sea Lord, 21 May 1942, NAC, RG 24 D13, Vol.11969, NW223; and Samuel Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, 410-14.

49. Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Ministers, 30 April 1942, DHist, 193.009 (D6).

50. G.N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II, 194-5; and Flag Officer Newfoundland, Report of Proceedings, May 1942, DHist, NSS 1000-5-20.

51. BdU War Diary, 16-27 May 1942, DHist, 79/446, Vol.5; HMS Caldwell, DHist, Ships Cards; and HMS Burnham, Report of Proceedings, 29 May 1942, NAC, RG 24, Vol.6789, NSS 8280-800/9.

52. George Caulton to NSHQ, 22 May 1942, NAC, RG 24 D1, Vol.6789, NSS 8280-800/9.

53. Jurgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, 99.

54. D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 298-303. Tanker shipments to the northeast US declined from 1.4 million barrels per day in 1941 to 391,000 barrels in 1942.

55. Karl Dönitz, Memoirs, 251-2.

56. D.J. Payton-Smith, Oil, 379.



Copyright © Robert C. Fisher 1993


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